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Abstract
The competition authorities have devoted consider-
able time and energy to investigating anticompeti-
tive conduct in the broad area of liquid fuel, gas and
related products, where regulation sets rules for firm
conduct. Competition cases have included the
Sasol-Engen merger, collusive arrangements in gas
distribution and the pricing of bitumen for road con-
struction projects, and alleged coordination through
information exchange in diesel. Drawing on a
review of these matters we assess the inter-relation-
ships between regulation and competition enforce-
ment. We argue that regulation can be designed to
enable greater competitive rivalry, while anti-com-
petitive conduct can also be better remedied
through recognition of the role of regulation.
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1. Introduction
There has been much debate in South Africa as
elsewhere about the relationships between compe-
tition authorities and regulators, and between com-
petition and regulation.1 There have also been
court cases regarding the boundaries of the jurisdic-
tion of regulators and the competition authorities,
especially in telecommunications (Moodaliyar and
Weeks, 2009). We focus on the inter-relationships
between the two to better understand the nature of
tensions and of complementarities between the two
regimes.
At the outset we caution that it should not be
assumed that there is a standard form of economic
regulation nor of competition/antitrust. For exam-
ple, some (Ginsberg, 2009) contrast antitrust and
economic regulation in terms of objectives, observ-
ing that antitrust has consumer welfare as its objec-
tive while economic regulation typically has eco-
nomic development and sector-specific goals.
However, South Africa’s competition law has a total
welfare standard and has a range of objectives
encompassing participation in the economy and
addressing the legacy of concentration of control
bequeathed by apartheid. International reviews
also reveal a range of objectives, standards and
frameworks (Fox, 2003; Singh, 2002).
We start by briefly characterising economic reg-
ulation and competition law and note some of the
tensions that have been identified in the literature.
In section 2, we then focus on the liquid fuels
regime, describing its evolution and the proposed
Sasol-Engen merger. Section 3 examines how pre-
vious regulation (and the role of the state) set up
challenges for competition enforcement, drawing
on a review of competition cases. In section 4 we
then reflect back from the competition challenges to
the ways in which regulation and competition can
work better together, with clarity on roles and
responsibilities.
The economic regulation which we have today
in South Africa, as in many other countries, is in the
main about regulating the natural monopoly parts
of the economy that were state owned and have
been privatised. Regulation is generally understood
as ex ante because, in the absence of competitive
discipline on market power, the regulators set rules
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within which businesses make forward-looking
investment and production decisions (Viscusi et al.,
2000). Regulators seek to ensure that a fair return is
earned on investments made but not an exploitative
one (Newbery, 1997). Three decades ago, it was
widely believed that regulation would ‘wither away’
as competition developed. However, it has become
evident that regulation is required to ensure the
competitive space remains open and to govern
aspects such as access to critical infrastructure.
Indeed, regulation may seek to create what
Ginsberg (2009) has termed ‘synthetic competition’
where the dynamic gains from rivalry, such as in
terms of product and service development, are
judged to merit several competitors where scale
economies imply that only one firm would minimise
costs.
Competition enforcement is most effective in
dealing with firms’ conduct in markets that would
support competition absent the targeted behaviour.
It is about evaluating conduct in ex post assess-
ments of whether competition has been harmed
(OECD, 1999; Buigues, 2006; de Streel, 2004).
Contraventions are deterred through penalties on
such conduct. Remedies in competition cases can,
however, also involve changes to conduct (such as
banning exclusive dealing or types of loyalty induc-
ing rebates) and/or changes to structure. 
Tensions between competition and regulation
can arise in instances where regulation limits the
scope of competition laws and instances where reg-
ulation makes it increasingly difficult to enforce the
competition law. The former is not an issue in the
South African context as the Competition Act was
amended to give the competition authorities juris-
diction over all sectors including those that have
sector regulators. The latter arises where regulation
creates a structure which is not conducive to com-
petition (ICN, 2004). 
Economic regulation and competition law may
be complementary even while their goals differ (de
Streel, 2004). For example, regulation and compe-
tition law may work together to support entrants
and smaller rivals in markets with an entrenched
incumbent that have been recently opened to com-
petition. Competition can be facilitated if the regu-
lator has intervened to alleviate the potential com-
petition problems (ICN, 2004).
This complementarity also stems from the tools
that are at the disposal of the two authorities. In cir-
cumstances where the intervention required is
extensive and/or frequent, or where the remedies
that are available to competition authorities are
insufficient to address such conduct, then it may be
better to use ex-ante regulation (Buigues, 2006;
Geradin & O’Donoghue, 2005). By comparison,
competition law typically has stronger powers of
investigation and sanction to uncover anticompeti-
tive practices which may be undermining the objec-
tives of regulation, including where a firm is using
benefits from regulation in one market to engage in
anti-competitive conduct in another (ICN, 2004;
Buigues, 2006). Without overlapping jurisdiction of
regulators and competition authorities, the risk is
that there may be gaps where neither competition
law nor regulation applies. This could occur as an
unintended consequence of regulation creating a
position of market power in a related market that
the firm claims is not covered by the competition
law.2
It is against this backdrop that we reflect on the
South African energy value chains, and argue for
regulation for competition, to complement compe-
tition law and to facilitate better market outcomes. 
2. The legacy of liquid fuels policy and
objectives under apartheid3
The history of regulation in the refining and mar-
keting of petrochemical products entrenched a
long-standing culture of coordinated behaviour
between oil companies. Government intervened
extensively in petrochemical markets to develop a
synthetic fuels industry to reduce dependency on
imported crude oil and vulnerability to sanctions in
the apartheid period. Low grade coal supply in the
inland region allowed the formation by the state of
a synthetic fuels producer, South African Coal, Oil
and Gas Corporation Limited, later Sasol Limited,
in the 1950s. 
In 1954, government brokered the Main Supply
Agreement (MSA) between Sasol and other crude
oil refining companies, obliging the other oil com-
panies (OOCs) to purchase Sasol’s production to
meet their inland fuel demand. The OOCs were
committed to purchase all of Sasol’s production vol-
umes pro-rata to their market shares. The regulation
here effectively represented a bargain between the
multinational refiners present in the country (includ-
ing Shell, BP, Total and Chevron) and Sasol togeth-
er with the South African state (Rustomjee et al,
2007). This favoured Sasol’s growth and domi-
nance in the inland region. 
Sasol sold to the OOCs at import parity prices,
where hypothetical transport costs were added to a
free-on-board international price to arrive at a local
South African price as though the refined product
was imported. This pricing structure was initially
known as the In Bond Landed Cost (IBLC) and
later evolved into the ‘basic fuel price’ (BFP) and
was the foundation for the wholesale list selling
price for petroleum products (Corbett et al., 2010).
In certain instances, key policy issues were not leg-
islated, rather, a system of ‘gentlemen’s agreements’
was put in place by the oil companies to regulate
the industry (Rustomjee et al., 2007). 
Support was given to compensate the crude oil
refiners for having to mothball a substantial portion
of their refining capacity. The arrangements meant
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the crude oil refiners agreed to purchase all Sasol’s
output in exchange for a guaranteed margin4 at the
marketing level, which Sasol agreed not to enter.
Competition between fuel producers was essential-
ly removed in the interests of supporting the prof-
itability of Sasol (Rustomjee, 2012).
Sasol was also supported by a dispensation5
where synthetic fuel producers (which included
Mossgas) received tariff protection when crude oil
prices fell below a defined floor price and had to put
additional revenue into an Equalisation Fund when
crude oil prices rose above a ceiling price
(Rustomjee et al., 2007).
Extensive regulation of the liquid fuels industry
continued despite the government’s liberalisation
policy as articulated in the Energy White Paper of
1998. When the Competition Act came into effect
in 1999 it was intended to be part of an evolution
to less regulation, and the oil companies applied for
and were granted an exemption from the
Competition Act for certain arrangements to ease
the transition from a heavily protected environment
to a more liberalised one. In 2002, Sasol applied for
and was granted another exemption from the collu-
sion provisions of the Competition Act for a number
of market allocation agreements with the OOCs.
The exemption was granted until 31 December
2003. At the end of 1998, Sasol gave the required
5 year notice to end the Main Supply Agreement in
December 2003. In 1998 the Government also
released Sasol from the obligation to repay any out-
standing subsidies it had received during the ‘Pim
Goldby’ era provided it continued to develop the
petrochemicals sector (National Treasury, 2007).
From the end of 2003 Sasol has been free to enter
and expand into the marketing and retailing of fuel,
and the OOCs have not been required to buy Sasol
products.
According to the Competition Tribunal (2006),
the MSA had amounted in effect to a cartel: 
In our view and, we note again, this view is
essentially uncontroverted – the South
African fuel market, from the refinery level
through to the level of the retail service sta-
tion, was cartelised for many years. The MSA
was in effect the market sharing agreement
entered into by the participants in the cartel
with the price of refined product based on
import parity or BFP which was then used to
build up to the wholesale price and the retail
pump price. (Para 122 p 46)
It appears as if the new government’s change in
the basis of calculating the wholesale price in the
price build-up from the IBLC to the ‘Basic Fuel
Price’ and intention to de-regulate the market stim-
ulated Sasol’s termination of the MSA as Sasol
anticipated competitive pressure (Competition
Tribunal, 2006, para 123). Sasol wanted to be able
to enter and expand in the downstream retail mar-
kets (para 125). At the same time, it sought to
entrench its dominant position inland and extend its
retail presence nationally through the proposed
merger of its fuel business with Engen in a merger
to create a new entity to be termed uHambo.
The uHambo merger sought to secure a down-
stream retail and distribution footprint as well as to
control refining capacity at one of the large crude oil
refineries on the coast. The importance of these
objectives can be appreciated by understanding the
competitive threat to Sasol that was expressed in
the bargaining games that occurred at the end of
the MSA as the OOCs were no longer obliged to up-
lift all of Sasol’s synfuels production (Corbett et al.,
2011; Competition Tribunal, 2006). At the time, the
OOCs had excess capacity at the coast and were
exporting products which they could have sold
locally had they not been required to buy all of
Sasol’s production. After 2003, in purchasing
inland volumes from Sasol, they therefore sought
discounts off the inland BFP (set as the import par-
ity price), as Sasol had a surplus of product, did not
have its own distribution network, and also had
very low production costs. Sasol on the other hand
only wanted to offer product at the BFP to protect
it as the benchmark price, and thus had to credibly
threatened to reduce supply, either by reducing pro-
duction (which it did at the Natref refinery) or by
exporting product (Competition Tribunal, 2006).
The uHambo transaction would simultaneously
provide Sasol with a route to market for its own
product (through the Engen network, the largest in
the country) without having to rely on the OOCs,
and refinery capacity at the coast (the Engen refin-
ery). The Tribunal prohibited the merger due large-
ly to the effect of the former, judging that Sasol
could credibly threaten to ‘foreclose’ (not supply)
OOCs as customers for bulk supply of fuels, the
impact of which was exacerbated by capacity con-
straints on the Durban-Johannesburg Pipeline
which limited OOCs from bringing in the product
from the coast, and as competitors in retail and
commercial markets. The merger was contested by
all the OOCs in Tribunal hearings involving detailed
scrutiny of Sasol’s operations and intentions. The
Competition Commission at first supported the
merger, and then altered its position (Competition
Tribunal, 2006). The Competition Tribunal ulti-
mately prohibited the merger and Sasol has had to
expand in the downstream market through incre-
mentally adding forecourts and obtaining commer-
cial customers.
The other major threat to Sasol has been a pos-
sible change in the taxation and/or regulatory
regime. This was most obviously in the form of the
mooted windfall tax on excessive profits. National
Treasury established a task team to evaluate the
arguments which recommended such a tax should
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be pursued. National Treasury rejected the recom-
mendations of the Task Team on grounds which
included the fact that Sasol had committed to ‘sig-
nificantly expand its synthetic fuel production
capacity’ in the interests of ‘fuel security’ and devel-
opment of petrochemicals (National Treasury,
2007:4).6 Having headed off the possible windfall
tax, it appears that certain projects will not be pur-
sued without very substantial participation and sup-
port from the state. 
Sasol’s continued hold over supply of fuels in
the inland market in particular has been reinforced
by their position as joint owner in the exploitation of
Mozambican gas and in the pipeline delivering it to
Secunda. The pricing of the gas has been subject to
maximum regulation for the first ten years from
2004 to 2014, with the volume weighted price not
to exceed an average price of selected European
countries, while individual customers can be
charged up to a maximum determined as the price
of their alternative energy source (including the cost
of physically switching to gas). This latter provision
is effectively the monopoly price in any case as it is
the maximum price that Sasol could offer in order
to attract the individual buyer to switch to natural
gas.
The legacy of the apartheid liquid fuels policies
has resulted in the concentrated markets that are
found throughout these value chains and has fur-
ther placed Sasol in a particular position of influ-
ence in terms of fuel supply. The barriers to entry
are substantial, as is witnessed by the slow rate of
entry, particularly of historically disadvantaged
South Africans (Mokoena and Lloyd, 2005). Over
the last decade, the Competition Commission has
uncovered cartels in related products, such as bitu-
men and piped gas; referred a case of coordinated
conduct in diesel to the Competition Tribunal and
has pursued a number of enforcement cases as
explained below.
3. Regulation in the petroleum industry and
competition enforcement
As of 2013, the prices of certain products, such as
petrol at the retail/pump level, loose illuminating
paraffin at the retail level and liquid petroleum gas
at the refinery gate and retail level, are still regulat-
ed by the Department of Energy (DoE). These
prices are posted on the department website and
published monthly in the Government Gazette.
Diesel is referred to as a ‘controlled’ product.
Government measures the return being made on
the marketing of controlled products and sets the
prices of regulated products (for example, of retail
petrol) in order to yield a rate of return for the
industry on marketing assets of between 10% and
20% (Rustomjee et al., 2007). Although not regu-
lated by legislation, the wholesale list selling price
(WLSP) of diesel is published on DoE’s website.
The industry has used this posted WLSP as the list
price for wholesale diesel sales. Competition
between the oil companies is therefore largely
through discounts off this wholesale list price and
through quality of service.
Certain information has been required from the
oil companies for the calculations relating to the
regulatory framework. However, the oil companies
also exchanged such information between each
other. The exchange of information between the oil
companies began as early as the 1960s with a sin-
gle company tasked to gather and disseminate
information. The National Energy Council in 1989
requested that this data be submitted to govern-
ment on a more disaggregated level for research
purposes and to inform policy (Corbett et al.,
2010). There was, however, no requirement and no
justification from a regulatory perspective to
exchange this information, particularly company
specific information, between the oil companies
themselves.
In 1994, the South African Petroleum Industry
Association (SAPIA) was created. SAPIA, an indus-
try organisation to which all the oil companies still
belong, was originally created for the oil industry to
engage with the new African National Congress
(ANC) government and other stakeholders. It also
undertook the handling of information between oil
companies, and between oil companies and gov-
ernment.
The history of regulation in the petroleum indus-
try has created well understood, focal pricing points
that could allow for coordinated behaviour to con-
tinue in markets which are no longer regulated and
in which exemptions from competition law no
longer apply (Corbett et al., 2010). This transparen-
cy was further enhanced through the highly disag-
gregated information exchanged via the SAPIA
platform. For unregulated products like commercial
diesel, these published prices could act as focal
points of which competition would occur only
through discounting. If secret discounting is dis-
couraged through the exchange of disaggregated
information (such as detailed information on sales
volumes) which increased the ability to monitor
market shares, then competition is stifled, particu-
larly in an oligopolistic industry such as the oil
industry.
A player has no incentive to secretly discount to
gain market share if it knows that this action is
immediately visible to its competitors through the
information exchange (Corbett et al, 2010). The
Competition Commission referred a case against
the main oil companies, alleging that such informa-
tion exchange amounted to a contravention of the
cartel provisions of the Act.7
Information exchange was also part of the con-
duct in the bitumen arrangements. The
Commission referred to the Competition Tribunal a
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cartel case against the oil companies on price fixing
in the bitumen market, a petroleum product used to
make tar to pave roads. This was in contravention
of Section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Act. Sasol, the leniency
applicant in this case admitted to continued coordi-
nation in the post-exemption period based on
import parity pricing formulae established in the
exemption period and suitable escalations.8
Masana/BP, Shell and Engen all subsequently set-
tled with the Commission and admitted that the
arrangements contravened section 4(1)(b)(i) which
addresses direct and indirect price fixing.
During the exemption period, the petrochemical
companies jointly calculated the prices for bitumen
with reference to an industry-wide retail price list,
the Wholesale List Selling Price (WLSP). After the
exemption lapsed in the latter part of 2000, there
was no longer a standard method by which list
prices for bitumen could be changed according to
the changes in crude oil prices. The primary pro-
ducers agreed to set the WLSP each month by set-
ting a ‘starting’ price for February 2002 and esca-
lating this by a factor determined through a formu-
la, the Bitumen Price Index (BPI) which later
became the Bitumen Price Adjustment Factor
(BPAF). This was deemed an appropriate price
escalation factor for long-term road construction
contracts.
The development and implementation of the
BPAF was done through another industry associa-
tion, South African Bitumen Industry Association
(SABITA). Information was exchanged through reg-
ular e-mail communications where BPAF percent-
ages and/or Rand per ton escalation figures were
circulated to the oil companies. The BPAF then
would be added to the present month’s WLSP to
arrive at the following month’s WLSP. It was there-
fore clearly forward-looking and gave an indication
of what the market was likely to do in terms of mag-
nitude of list price increases the next month and
amounted to collusive conduct (Boshoff, 2013). In
addition to such information exchange via emails,
there were bilateral communications between oil
companies. While the agreement did not fix the
transaction prices of bitumen, it had the effect of
dampening competition, undermining discounting
below list prices and, as a result, underpinning high-
er prices.
The Competition Commission has also assessed
coordinated conduct in the piped gas market.
Pricing of piped gas is regulated by NERSA through
provisions in the Gas Act 2001 (Act No. 48 of 2001)
and Schedule One of the Agreement Concerning
the Mozambican Gas Pipeline between the
Government of the RSA and Sasol Limited. Poss-
ible contraventions of Section 4 of the Competition
Act, particularly involving market allocation, were
brought to the Commission’s attention through a
leniency application by Sasol Gas Ltd in 2009.9 
Sasol is the main producer of natural gas
sourced from Mozambique as well as methane rich
gas produced in its Secunda plant. These gases are
transported via pipeline to industry and household
users. Sasol applied for leniency for participating in
a series of agreements entered into with Spring
Lights Gas in KwaZulu-Natal and Egoli Gas in
Johannesburg, both competitors to Sasol Gas.
These agreements contained non-compete clauses
that amounted to market allocation by region
(which therefore implied allocation of regional cus-
tomers too), a contravention of Section 4(1)(b)(ii)
of the Competition Act.
Spring Lights Gas further applied for an exemp-
tion from the Competition Act seeking to maintain
the non-compete clauses in the agreement on
grounds that it needed the exemption to survive
and grow its business, particularly in light of the fact
that its sole supplier is Sasol, with whom it also
competes. The Commission found that the non-
compete clauses were not necessary for Spring
Lights to effectively compete with Sasol, given pro-
tection offered through the regulatory framework,10
and rejected the exemption application. 
In these circumstances, the Commission viewed
the Competition Act as a secondary defence and
that the regulatory framework was sufficient to
ensure existing and new gas traders were protected
from any potential abuses of dominance by Sasol.
There have thus been a number of cases of anti-
competitive conduct which are closely related to
past and current regulatory framework for liquid
fuels. In addition, there have been competition
cases in by-products of liquid fuels production and
their derivatives in fertilizer and polymer chemicals
(Makhaya and Roberts, 2013). 
4. What are the appropriate roles of
competition law and regulation?
Traditionally competition law is presented as being
about addressing structural changes (mergers) and
conduct in the absence of which there would be
competition, while economic regulation controls
market power in instances where competition is
either not possible or is not desirable (de Streel,
2004; Lang, 2009). This fits neatly with the distinc-
tion drawn between the ex-ante nature of regulation
and ex-post nature of competition law intervention
in markets. However, it does not accord with the
reality of how markets work and firms’ strategies to
create and protect rents from the exercise of market
power.
Leaving aside mergers, cartel enforcement
would appear to be the most straightforward area
where, in the absence of cartel agreements, there
would be competition. However, in tight oligopolies
of ‘insiders’, who have well established norms for
maintaining the status quo, collusive outcomes may
exist without the need for explicit arrangements.
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These arrangements may well have been devel-
oped under past regulatory arrangements or in an
environment where coordination was tolerated or
even encouraged, such as where the policy and reg-
ulatory framework had been ‘captured’ by the
industry. This accords with the coordinated
arrangements uncovered by the Competition
Commission in several markets such as cement,
bitumen and fertilizer. In each of these markets,
after the ending of such formal arrangements for
coordination as existed, firms established their own
mechanisms. While the Commission has tackled
such mechanisms, it may require entry to destabilise
the collective understanding in place. Even in
industries with apparently low barriers to entry, col-
lusive outcomes can persist for some time (Khumalo
et al., 2014).
Entry barriers due to scale economies may be
further reinforced by vertical integration on the part
of incumbents implying that an entrant at one level
needs to source inputs from firms associated with its
rivals. As Geroski and Jacquemin (1984: 22) cau-
tion: ‘when, however, small asymmetries can be
solidified into dominant positions that persist, the
inequities they create become institutionalized, cre-
ating long-term problems in the performance of the
economic system which cry out for policy attention’. 
In relatively small industrial economies, such as
South Africa, there is also a greater prevalence of
markets dominated by a single firm (Chabane et al.,
2006; Roberts, 2012). The large open markets of
the USA and the EU are outliers when viewed
against the conditions characterising most econ-
omies in the world. 
Imperfect competition is thus commonplace,
rather than an aberration resulting from readily
identifiable anti-competitive arrangements. As such,
it is important to understand the way in which com-
petition works in practice and to guard against over-
simplifying it, for example, by simplistically seeking
to separate out natural monopoly elements for reg-
ulation, and assuming there will be ‘free’ competi-
tion elsewhere (Helm and Jenkinson, 1998: 2).
Against the reality of competitive rivalry, choices
about both competition law and regulation are
about setting the ‘rules of the game’ or deciding on
the ‘economic constitution’ of a country (Gerber,
2010). These are part of a set of rules and institu-
tions which influence who has access to economic
opportunities and on what terms, and whether the
economy tends towards being inclusive or extrac-
tive (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
We now consider these issues in terms of the
objectives, analytical framework and tools of regu-
latory bodies and competition authorities, drawing
on the cases discussed above. 
The objectives of regulators may appear wider
than those of competition authorities, in including
the development of the economy, and more partic-
ular, in addressing the development of a selected
sector. However, competition law can have a wide
mandate as part of economic welfare. For example,
the objectives of the South Korean Fair Trade
Commission (KFTC) are to encourage free and fair
competition, prevent the concentration of econom-
ic power and thereby promote ‘balanced develop-
ment’ (Wise, 2000). This is given that the early
stages of rapid industrialisation were viewed as
‘unbalanced’, requiring an active competition poli-
cy addressed at dominant firms in that country
(Fox, 2002; Fox, 2003). The mandate of the KFTC
therefore includes evaluating ‘unreasonable’ prac-
tices and ‘unjustifiable’ restrictions on competition
(Fox, 2003; KFTC, 2011). The South African
Competition Act has a range of objectives that
reflect the importance of addressing the apartheid
legacy of the concentration of control, although
arguably these objectives only find expression in the
provisions for merger evaluation which include a
public interest test.
Relevant to the cases examined here, regulation
of liquid fuels had originally been part of the
apartheid state’s objective to ensure local produc-
tion, by Sasol in particular. Security of supply
remains a natural government concern. However,
this is not necessarily in conflict with competitive
outcomes over time. Supply of refined product
means ensuring logistics and transport capacity to
get product to market, consistent with vigorous
competition between suppliers to meet demand.
Regulation and competition law seeking to ensure
dynamic rivalry, increased access and competitive
pricing could thus take quite a different stance to
the past regulation which sought to guarantee mar-
gins of oil companies, as the ‘insiders’. In addition,
the unintended consequences of regulatory provi-
sions that entrench market power in related prod-
ucts should be taken into account by regulatory
bodies and competition authorities.
The analytical framework for regulators and
competition authorities is substantially the same
(Piergiovanni et al., 2009). It is essentially about
evaluating firm conduct and outcomes in static and
dynamic terms. This includes the effect of arrange-
ments that undermine competition as well as the
impact of arrangements on efficiency and invest-
ment. The main difference is that competition
authorities make findings in specific instances, while
regulators make determinations about the neces-
sary arrangements to achieve efficient outcomes (or
approximate effective competition) looking for-
wards. Even this is an over-generalisation.
Competition authorities in some jurisdictions
(including in South Africa) have market enquiry
powers, that is, powers to investigate widely to
address competition problems in a market and
make far-reaching findings on necessary remedies.
Conversely, regulators in some regimes, including in
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South Africa, have to make findings of ‘inadequate
competition’ in order to trigger regulatory powers.11
Even where this is not explicit, the analysis of regu-
lators of what is necessary going forwards will likely
take into account what has happened in the past. 
The more important distinction is the in-depth
industry knowledge and the on-going monitoring
that a specialist regulator embodies as compared
with the generalist that is a competition authority.
Seen in these terms, the relative scope of regulation
and of competition enforcement is just a matter of
choice for a given country. This also applies to par-
ticular responsibilities within a sector, such as where
the regulator has powers to determine conditions of
access and/or issue licences along with, for example
maximum price caps, while the competition author-
ity investigates anti-competitive conduct. In this
world, the interplay of competition and regulation is
not so-much about drawing lines as it is about
understanding the complementarities in the work of
the institutions. In several countries, such as the
Netherlands and Australia, the common analytical
base has led to important regulatory bodies being
combined with the competition authority. The sep-
arate application of different laws, competition and
regulatory, does not prevent the development of
knowledge and expertise. In South Africa, the sep-
arate regulators and competition bodies have not
established effective mechanisms to build on the
complementarities while maintaining distinct roles.
Instead, the impression is of the emphasis of their
independence as an obstacle, rather than as a start-
ing premise from which to build constructive
engagement. 
The third area is the tools, by which we mean
the powers to change or set boundaries on behav-
iour. In competition law, remedies are available to
competition authorities include those that are
behavioural and structural, as well as sanctions in
the form of administrative fines (de Streel, 2004).
Administrative penalties perform a deterrence role,
assuming that it is simply about deterring the con-
duct in the absence of which there will be adequate
competition (and the efficient outcomes therefrom).
Remedies seek to stop the anti-competitive conduct
of the respondent and to restore competition
(Marsden, 2008). 
Structural remedies will, at least on the surface,
require less monitoring than behavioural undertak-
ings and tend to be preferred for competition
authorities (OECD, 2004; de Streel 2004). At one
extreme is divestiture, which seeks to create more
competition through structural change. At the other
is a behavioural remedy on pricing, such as to
address a margin squeeze which results from the
upstream and downstream prices of a vertically
integrated firm. Pricing remedies are viewed as the
tools more associated with regulators. However,
there are many other types of conduct that are less
easily categorised in terms of the structural/behav-
ioural separation. For example, loyalty rebates are
prices that seek to achieve de facto exclusivity and
can be seen as substitutable with pricing offered for
exclusive contracts.
In South African case law, administrative fines
and remedies are primarily used as deterrent and
corrective tools. There has however only been one
instance where a structural remedy was adopted for
an abuse of dominance under section 8 of the Act
of 1998. This was in the complaint of abuse of
dominance in the market for ammonia derivative
products against Sasol Chemical Industries.12 The
remedy involved a combination of commitments
regarding pricing (not to discriminate by location of
customer) with divestiture of all but one down-
stream blending operation. The pricing remedy
does not therefore stipulate maximum prices nor
require ongoing monitoring on a month by month
basis. In other cases such as SAA and Patensie the
remedies have simply been the ending of the con-
duct being the form of rebates in SAA and the
exclusivity in Patensie (Roberts, 2012).
The cases discussed above illustrate that the
competition authorities have been pursuing alleged
anti-competitive conduct, while the firms are sub-
ject to regulation in important areas of their busi-
ness, which relate to their market power in associat-
ed products. The worlds of regulators and competi-
tion enforcers have not been talking to each other.
One consequence is the long and drawn out com-
petition investigations and prosecutions where, if
proven, the remedies would be of a quasi-regulato-
ry nature, even if implemented by the competition
authorities. These cases could be strengthened by
appropriate regulatory measures, if the competition
concerns have merit. Rather than drawing what
may be unhelpful distinctions between structural
and behavioural measures, it is therefore more
appropriate to recognise the skills and capabilities
of regulators and competition authorities assessed
against the nature of the problem. For example,
whether the position of the dominant firm is linked
to licencing arrangements, and/or there is regulation
of some of the products, should be taken into
account.
5. Regulating for competition?
The institutional make-up of regulators and compe-
tition authorities mean they have a natural tenden-
cy to certain types of arrangements which might
blinker them to the benefits of competition and reg-
ulation when combined. Regulators by their nature
engage with a small number of large firms on which
they develop detailed information and with which
they have extensive interactions. The relationships
that develop will naturally lead to an appreciation of
the firms’ capabilities, the importance of the incum-
bents in ensuring security of supply, and a tenden-
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cy to under-estimate the value of opening up to
new rivals. However, there are likely to be substan-
tial dynamic benefits from regulating for competi-
tion in terms of incentivising new ideas, service,
quality and product offerings. While it will intrinsi-
cally be less stable in the short term, greater access
and rivalry generates information for the regulator,
and tests assumptions in the established system
which can make it more robust in the longer-term.
On the side of the competition authorities, the
tendency is to have very discrete interventions and
to deter anticompetitive conduct (rather than to reg-
ulate it). However, in industries by their nature char-
acterised by entrenched firms seeking to protect
their positions, this simply means repeated exten-
sive investigations and drawn-out legal processes.
This could therefore mean as much detailed
enquiry into a firm by the competition authority as
is undertaken by the regulator. And, in terms of
addressing the conduct, powers that can be por-
trayed as ‘regulatory’, whether in the hands of a
regulator or the competition authorities, are neces-
sary and appropriate to address the anti-competi-
tive conduct in a way that is credible and ensures
more competitive outcomes in practice. In addition,
regulatory measures tailored to enable entrants and
smaller rivals will ensure less need for such invasive
remedies in the future. Regulatory measures can
provide certainty in advance that can facilitate entry
into markets, critical in markets where dominant
firms have engaged in reputational strategies to dis-
courage entry or have entrenched dominance
(Lang, 2009: 30). The facilitation of entry and pro-
motion of effective rivalry creates a landscape for
competition to work more effectively. 
Notes
1. See, for example, papers at the Annual Conference
on Competition Law, Economics and Policy, available
at www.compcom.co.za 
2. This was contended by Telkom in the case brought by
Value Added Network Service providers to the
Competition Commission. After the Commission’s
referral on 24 February 2004 there were over five
years of litigation over jurisdictional points brought by
Telkom including over the proper application of regu-
lation and competition, until the Supreme Court of
Appeal decision on 27 November 2009.
3. This draws substantially on Rustomjee et al. (2007);
Competition Tribunal (2006); Rustomjee (2012).
4. Until 1989, refining margins were guaranteed along
with returns on marketing assets. From 1989 only the
returns on marketing assets were regulated through
setting retail prices to allow this return. Bulk supply
prices (wholesale prices) for refined products were
regulated at import parity.
5. Following an investigation by Pim Goldby consult-
ants.
6. In particular, Sasol had undertaken to pursue the
Mafutha project, of a large new coal to liquids plant in
the Waterberg. 
7. See Competition Commission media release,
‘Commission refers a case of collusion against oil
companies’ 24 October 2012, www.compcom.co.za
accessed 20 November 2012. 
8. Competition Commission media release, ‘The
Commission refers its price fixing findings against
major oil companies’ 4 March 2010, www.comp-
com.co.za accessed 10 June 2012.
9. www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/
MyDocuments/March-09-Newsletter-31.pdf, accessed
on 29 August 2012
10. For instance, through non-discrimination require-
ments, access on commercially reasonable terms to
facilities as well as powers by the regulator to investi-
gate complaints relating to issues of supply and exces-
sive prices or tariffs, amongst others.
11. As under the Gas Act, section 21(1)(p), for NERSA to
regulate maximum prices for piped gas.
12 The consent and settlement agreement was con-
firmed by the Tribunal on 20 July 2010. See
www.comptrib.co.za 
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